Source: Weber, Marcel. "The Crux of Crucial Experiments: Duhem's Problems and Inference to the Best Explanation." Brit. J. Phil. Sci. 60, 19-49
Pierre Duhem is famous for his severe philosophical criticism of severe testing, or crucial experimentation, in science. A crucial experiment would follow a form of eliminative induction as follows.
Second, while we can purport to parse the full field of contenders in logic or mathematics, we cannot do so in physics or economics. According to Duhem, “Shall we ever dare to assert that no other hypothesis is imaginable?”
The answer, of course, is no. But Duhem’s dire turn of phrase should not deter us from saying, "Big deal," and forging on with science uncowed. We might accept a pragmatic constraint on science as necessitating or justifying a means of distinguishing between theories, because the alternative, anarchy, is unacceptable.
Said differently, Duhem’s epistemic standards are too high: imaginability is not a useful criterion with which to judge science.
The conventional answer as I have phrased it is pick the best hypothesis, call it theory, and move on. This is called inference to the best explanation and it is the line taken by Marcel Weber.
The conventional rejoinder comes as a finer distillation of the Duhem critique. This is Bas van Fraassen’s “bad lot”-argument: if all the choices are crappy, even the least crappy is still crappy. Well, crap.
Pierre Duhem is famous for his severe philosophical criticism of severe testing, or crucial experimentation, in science. A crucial experiment would follow a form of eliminative induction as follows.
Starting with alternate hypotheses of an evidenced phenomena, an experiment could negate one or all but one by showing contradiction with the evidence. This constitutes modus tollens or denying the consequent of the form “If h1, then e. Not e. Therefore, not h1.” If e follows from h2, then by disjunctive syllogism we can conclude the veracity of h2, or the last hypothesis standing.
Such a train of inference from experimentation is admissible according to logic, but it faces two difficulties in practice.
First, hypotheses are not singular postulates but conjunctive bundles. They rely on auxiliary hypotheses which rely on auxiliary hypotheses which rely on auxiliary hypotheses and so on... This is called the problem of untested auxiliaries.
Such a train of inference from experimentation is admissible according to logic, but it faces two difficulties in practice.
First, hypotheses are not singular postulates but conjunctive bundles. They rely on auxiliary hypotheses which rely on auxiliary hypotheses which rely on auxiliary hypotheses and so on... This is called the problem of untested auxiliaries.
Eliminative induction fails because humans cannot pinpoint error; they cannot grab the tip of the devil’s tail.
Second, while we can purport to parse the full field of contenders in logic or mathematics, we cannot do so in physics or economics. According to Duhem, “Shall we ever dare to assert that no other hypothesis is imaginable?”
The answer, of course, is no. But Duhem’s dire turn of phrase should not deter us from saying, "Big deal," and forging on with science uncowed. We might accept a pragmatic constraint on science as necessitating or justifying a means of distinguishing between theories, because the alternative, anarchy, is unacceptable.
Said differently, Duhem’s epistemic standards are too high: imaginability is not a useful criterion with which to judge science.
The conventional answer as I have phrased it is pick the best hypothesis, call it theory, and move on. This is called inference to the best explanation and it is the line taken by Marcel Weber.
The conventional rejoinder comes as a finer distillation of the Duhem critique. This is Bas van Fraassen’s “bad lot”-argument: if all the choices are crappy, even the least crappy is still crappy. Well, crap.

